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NO. 56 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction 
The Hong Kong National Security Law 
A Harbinger of China’s Emerging International Legal Discourse Power 
Moritz Rudolf 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Security Law) highlights the shortcomings 
of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the inherent conflicts of the “one coun-
try, two systems” principle. The arrangement has always been full of contradictions 
and grey areas. With the Security Law, the Chinese leadership has created facts on the 
ground. The move comes at the expense of civil liberties and accelerates the spread 
of socialist legal concepts in Hong Kong. But, on this issue, Beijing is not isolated in-
ternationally. On the contrary, it is supported by economically dependent states in 
its assessment of the Security Law as an internal affair. China’s ambition to gain inter-
national discourse power in legal matters is strategically embedded in the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). Beijing’s course of action in Hong Kong serves as a test balloon in this 
endeavour. Decision-makers in Germany and Europe are still not sufficiently aware of 
the problems concerning Chinese legal concepts. More expertise is urgently needed. 
 
The fact that Western democracies are 
increasingly isolated in their assessment 
of the Hong Kong question was recently 
underlined in the general debate of the 
3rd Committee of the United Nations (UN). 
Speaking on behalf of 39 states (including 
20 EU Member States, the USA, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, but also small states such 
as Nauru, Palau and Liechtenstein), the Ger-
man Ambassador expressed concern that sev-
eral provisions of the Security Law do not 
comply with China’s international legal obli-
gations. This was immediately followed by 
a statement made by the representative of 
Pakistan (representing 54 states) stressing 
that the law was an internal affair of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Just a few 
days later, on 13 October 2020, the inter-
national community elected China to the UN 
Human Rights Council for a three-year term. 
Content of the Security Law 
The Security Law entered into force on 
30 June 2020. According to Article 1, its 
purpose is 
∎ to implement the “one country, two sys-
tems” policy; 
∎ to prevent, suppress and punish seces-
sion, subversion, terrorism and collusion 
with foreign powers; 
∎ to maintain prosperity and stability in 
Hong Kong; 
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∎ to protect the rights and interests of 
Hong Kong residents. 
The law creates numerous institutional 
changes and creates new enforcement 
mechanisms, such as the “Committee 
for Safeguarding National Security”. The 
Committee is under the supervision of and 
accountable to the central government 
(Art. 12). The Committee’s decisions are not 
amenable to judicial review (Art. 14). The 
central government will appoint a National 
Security Adviser to sit in on meetings of 
the Committee (Art. 15). Furthermore, the 
police force will establish a department 
for safeguarding national security (which 
includes personnel from mainland China) 
with law enforcement capacity (Art. 16). 
The Hong Kong Department of Justice will 
also establish a specialised prosecution 
division (Art. 18). 
The law punishes secession (Art. 20 and 
Art. 21), subversion (Art. 22 and Art. 23), 
terrorist activities (Art. 24–28) and collu-
sion with a foreign country or with external 
elements to endanger national security 
(Art. 29 and Art. 30). Article 38 states that 
a criminal offence may also be committed 
outside Hong Kong and by persons who 
are not permanent residents in Hong Kong. 
Article 40 gives jurisdiction to Hong Kong. 
An exception is provided for where (a) the 
case is complex because of a foreign con-
nection, (b) a serious situation arises and 
the Hong Kong Government is unable to 
effectively enforce the law itself, or (c) a 
major and imminent threat to national 
security has occurred (Art. 55). In this case, 
the “Office for Safeguarding National Secu-
rity of the Central People’s Government”, 
exercises jurisdiction. The Office’s broad 
mandate, includes (1) analysing and assess-
ing the national security situation in Hong 
Kong (as well as submitting proposals on 
major national security strategies) (2) over-
seeing, guiding, coordinating with, and pro-
viding support to the local security author-
ities, (3) collecting and analysing intelli-
gence and information, and (4) handling 
cases concerning offences endangering na-
tional security (Art. 49). Following Article 
56, criminal proceedings may take place on 
the mainland. Chinese criminal procedural 
law applies. Hong Kong authorities must 
comply with the measures taken by the 
Office (Art. 57). The activities of the Office 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of Hong 
Kong (Art. 60). 
Criticism and Justification 
Since it was announced by the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) on 22 May 2020, 
the legality of the Security Law has been a 
bone of contention both inside and outside 
Hong Kong. The law is being discussed by 
politicians from around the world, aca-
demics, representatives of the Hong Kong 
government, and party cadres from main-
land China. This debate is revealing fun-
damentally different assessments of the 
Basic Law of Hong Kong, the 1984 Sino-
British Declaration and the “one country, 
two systems” principle. 
One aspect of the security law that is con-
troversial is its formal legality. Following 
Article 18 of the Basic Law, the Security Law 
was added to Annex III of the Basic Law, thus 
becoming part of the Hong Kong legal sys-
tem. However, Article 23 of the Basic Law ex-
plicitly attributes the legislative competence 
for such a law to the Hong Kong legislature. 
The Chinese side points out that previous 
attempts to pass a national security law (in 
2003) have failed and that it is, therefore, 
necessary to fill a regulatory gap to restore 
public order in Hong Kong. Beijing argues 
that it is entitled and obliged to do so. 
Substantive criticism has pointed out 
that the offences are vaguely defined and 
could be used for politically motivated 
criminal prosecution. The line between 
exercising individual civil liberties and vio-
lating national security is becoming increas-
ingly blurred. The rights codified in the 
Basic Law, so the criticism goes, are being 
undermined under the pretext of national 
security. While the law contains a general 
guarantee of respect for human rights, 
some of its other provisions preclude such 
protection. The law undermines the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, contrary to the 
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provisions of the Basic Law. The law also 
asserts jurisdiction over people who are 
neither residents of Hong Kong nor ever 
been there, even if their conduct is per-
fectly legal where the act is committed. 
This provision, therefore, even exceeds the 
provisions of China’s Criminal Law and 
standard international practice. 
The Chinese side, however, argues that 
the law affects merely a tiny fraction of the 
Hong Kong population, that it creates legal 
certainty and thus is a prerequisite for 
prosperity in the region. 
Seen from a Chinese perspective and in-
corporating Beijing’s understanding of law 
as a purely political instrument, this line of 
argument is quite consistent. In China, the 
Basic Law is seen as an ordinary law, where-
as in Hong Kong it is largely understood 
as a “mini-constitution”. By way of back-
ground: The Basic Law was drafted between 
1985 and 1990 with the participation of 
numerous representatives from Hong Kong, 
and adopted by the NPC in 1990. It entered 
into force on 1 July 1997. Under Article 
158 of the Basic Law, the power to review 
whether the Security Law is compatible 
with the Basic Law is vested in the Standing 
Committee of the NPC. Since it was the NPC 
which enacted the Security Law in the first 
place, it is not expected to question the 
legality of the law. 
As regards the allegation that the Securi-
ty Law undermines the independence of the 
judiciary, it is also important to look at how 
the law is applied. So far, the police forces 
have applied an extensive interpretation of 
the law. However, only a handful of people 
have been charged (as of 24 November 2020) 
under the Security Law (including one motor-
cyclist who collided with a group of police 
officers, teen activist and pro-independence 
advocate Tony Chung, and a delivery driver 
who allegedly chanted slogans calling for 
Hong Kong’s independence). While the 
offences are very broadly defined, it is also 
difficult to prove intent before the court. 
As long as there are still professional judges 
in Hong Kong, the main effect of the Hong 
Kong Security Law will be one of intimida-
tion. It is also not surprising that Beijing 
officials are already calling for further 
“judicial reform” in Hong Kong. In the 
meantime, the Security Law is sending a 
strong signal in the spirit of the Chinese 
idiom “Kill the chicken to scare the monkey 
(杀鸡儆猴)”. Critical voices fall silent for fear 
of persecution or criminal proceedings 
within the People’s Republic of China. 
Shortcomings of the Sino-British 
Declaration of 1984 
The Security Law illuminates weaknesses of 
the Sino-British Declaration of 1984 (Decla-
ration). The wording of the Declaration is 
vague, contradictory and leaves room for 
interpretation, which the PRC is now taking 
advantage of. 
The Declaration is an international treaty 
between the PRC and the United Kingdom. 
It governs the “resumption” of Chinese sov-
ereignty over Hong Kong (Article 1) and the 
“restoration” of Chinese sovereignty by 
the United Kingdom (Article 2). The negotia-
tions were initiated over concerns stem-
ming from the Hong Kong banking sector 
in the late 1970s. Financial institutions 
feared that land lease contracts in the New 
Territories (at that time a significant part of 
Hong Kong’s revenue) could only be con-
cluded for an increasingly short period. The 
cut-off date was 27 June 1997, three days 
before the expiry of the lease that the UK 
and China had signed in 1898. There were 
fears of a sharp rise in interest rates and de-
mands for clarity about Hong Kong’s future.  
The bilateral negotiations were charac-
terised by a strong power asymmetry to 
the detriment of London. The Chinese side 
issued an ultimatum for the conclusion 
of an agreement in autumn 1983. Beijing 
threatened that, should Britain not meet 
this ultimatum, it would take unilateral 
action to reclaim Hong Kong. To reach an 
agreement at all, the British side showed 
great willingness to compromise. 
Already at an early stage in the process, 
some legal scholars highlighted the grey 
areas and contradictions of the declaration, 
arguing that the implementation of the 
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treaty ultimately depended on the goodwill 
of the Chinese leadership. According to 
paragraph 3 (12), the rights and freedoms 
granted in the document will be stipulated 
in a Basic Law. However, the power of inter-
pretation (and the power to add new laws 
in the form of annexes) of the Basic Law is 
vested in the Standing Committee of the 
NPC. This enables the NPC to restrict the 
freedoms granted in the Declaration on the 
pretext of national security. The same logic 
applies to the “high degree of autonomy” 
granted to Hong Kong under paragraph 
3(2). The previous sentence states that Hong 
Kong is directly under the authority of the 
central government. Beijing may thus inter-
pret the phrases “high degree of autonomy” 
or “remain basically unchanged” (referring 
to the laws in force in Hong Kong) without 
formal external control mechanisms. 
The Security Law turns these concerns 
into a reality. Beijing argues that with 
the promulgation of the Basic Law and the 
return of Hong Kong to China, all obliga-
tions of the parties under the Joint Decla-
ration have been fully met. No further 
monitoring of the implementation of the 
agreement is therefore required. Since 
the PRC has sovereignty over Hong Kong, 
the Security Law is, in Beijing’s view, an 
internal matter. For the Chinese side, 
the main purpose of the Declaration was 
to gain sovereignty over Hong Kong and 
to put an end to its colonial past. 
The British side disagrees and sees Bei-
jing has having a continuing commitment 
to London until 2047, pointing out that 
the Security Law undermines the promised 
high degree of autonomy. 
In practice, Britain’s hands are largely 
tied. No mechanism has been established to 
monitor China’s long-term compliance with 
its obligations. A model for this would have 
been the 1921 Åland Convention. The fact 
that the PRC was not going to accept the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) was already clear at the time of 
the negotiations. The Joint Liaison Group, 
which originally oversaw the implementa-
tion of the Joint Declaration, was dissolved 
as planned on 1 January 2000. Since July 
1997, the UK Government has been pre-
paring regular reports on the implementa-
tion of the bilateral agreement. However, 
these reports are of purely symbolic value 
and are primarily an expression of “moral 
obligations” that London has towards the 
people of Hong Kong. 
The British side can certainly be criti-
cised for its short-term and over-optimistic 
approach towards Hong Kong. Until shortly 
before the return of the Crown Colony, Lon-
don had failed to create democratic struc-
tures or human rights standards in Hong 
Kong. The suppression of protests in Tibet 
(during the 1980s) and the Tiananmen Inci-
dent (1989) revealed to London a profound 
lack of protection of Hong Kong residents. 
Interestingly, however, it was the Chinese 
side which asserted a violation of the Decla-
ration when London attempted to build 
democratic structures in 1992 as part of the 
Patten proposals. 
The PRC Implements Its 
Interpretation of “One Country, 
Two Systems” 
With the Security Law, Beijing is demon-
strating its view of the principle of “one 
country, two systems”. The inherent con-
flicts in the arrangement are now coming 
to light. The “one country, two systems” 
principle in Hong Kong is, by design, rife 
with conflicts and contradictions. Western 
and Chinese interpretations were always 
different and neither side took the other’s 
perspective seriously. 
The “one country, two systems” formula 
in Hong Kong is an attempt to insert a sys-
tem of Common Law into a socialist system. 
The Common Law system is based on ideas 
of Western individual liberalism and the 
separation of powers. According to China’s 
socialist-Leninist ideology, all power of the 
state is concentrated in the NPC. There is 
no clear separation between the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches. The judi-
ciary is seen as part of the administration. 
The constitution and the law are instru-
ments for the fulfilment of political, eco-
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nomic and social goals. Western ideas such 
as the intrinsic value of the law, the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and the central 
role of the individual are alien to this sys-
tem. According to the PRC’s understanding 
of the law, rights are given to the individual 
by the central government. In the Common 
Law context, on the other hand, individual 
rights are assumed to be limited by the 
state through the law.  
Due to the asymmetrical power distribu-
tion favouring mainland China, the imple-
mentation of “one country, two systems” 
has always, to some extent, depended on 
Beijing’s self-restraint. Conflict over how 
to interpret the arrangement has been on-
going since 1997. To illustrate, since 1999, 
through its interpretations of the Basic Law, 
the NPC, has incrementally narrowed the 
scope of the independent judiciary. This 
is because the NPC’s interpretations of 
the Basic Law have a binding effect on the 
Hong Kong judges. Although, in the past, 
they have creatively sought to maintain 
their room for manoeuvre, the Hong Kong 
judiciary is increasingly internalising 
socialist values and today unquestioningly 
accepts the interpretations of the NPC. 
Political developments in China and 
Hong Kong further limit the scope for 
action. Under Xi Jinping, there are signifi-
cant efforts to expand state control meas-
ures in mainland China (e.g. through the 
National Security Law, Anti-Terrorism Law, 
Cybersecurity Law). These monitoring 
efforts also extend to Hong Kong. The Chi-
nese leadership interpretation of the prin-
ciple of “one country, two systems” in Hong 
Kong is increasingly restrictive. A White 
Paper on “The Practice of the ‘One Country, 
Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region” published by 
the central government in June 2014 states: 
“‘One country’ is the premise and basis for 
‘two systems’. ‘Two systems’ is subordinate 
to and derived from ‘one country’”. In the 
document, the central government also 
calls for a “patriotic” Hong Kong judiciary 
that supports the government. 
Political sentiment in Hong Kong has 
become more contentious since 2014. 
Triggered by what has been dubbed the 
“831 decision” of the NPC on the election of 
the Hong Kong Chief Executive, protesters 
occupied parts of central Hong Kong for 79 
days in late summer 2014 demanding more 
democracy. The government crackdown on 
the demonstrators radicalised parts of the 
movement. When the situation escalated in 
mid-2019 (over the issue of an extradition 
agreement with mainland China), it was 
only a matter of time before Hong Kong’s 
room for manoeuvre would be further 
restricted. The Security Law put a decisive 
end to the escalation for the time being. 
Incentives for Chinese self-restraint are 
diminishing. While Hong Kong was of 
major economic importance to Beijing as a 
gateway to the West in the 1980s, the Chi-
nese leadership is now trying to integrate 
Hong Kong into the “Guangdong-Hong Kong-
Macao Greater Bay Area” project. Although 
Hong Kong is likely to remain a key inter-
national commercial and capital hub the 
“one country, two systems” principle is 
expected to continue in Hong Kong only in 
the form of “one country, two economic 
systems”. 
Fight over International Legal 
Discourse Power 
The conflict has reached a deadlock. The 
majority of states within the UN support 
China’s legal view that the Security Law con-
stitutes an internal affair of the PRC. The 
chances of an ICJ advisory opinion or of the 
dispute being settled by any other inter-
national dispute resolution mechanism are 
slim. The Hong Kong issue has evolved into 
a conflict over international discourse power. 
And in this area, the PRC has a strategic ad-
vantage (see SWP-Studie 19/2020). 
Although many Western democracies 
are united in their criticism of Beijing, they 
are finding it difficult to convince other 
states to publicly express the same position 
towards China. Those condemning Beijing’s 
actions in Hong Kong include most EU Mem-
ber States, the UK, the US, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada and Japan, as well as sev-
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eral small island states, many of which have 
no diplomatic relations with Beijing. For 
others, the economic price of publicly criti-
cising China seems too high. Even Euro-
pean democracies (such as Greece, Malta, 
Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Cyprus) often remain silent. 
This isolation was particularly evident 
during the 44th session of the UN Human 
Rights Council. On 30 June 2020, the United 
Kingdom’s ambassador to the United 
Nations in Geneva criticised China’s Hong 
Kong policy on behalf of 27 countries. 
Shortly afterwards, Cuba spoke on behalf of 
52 states in support of the Chinese position. 
Hong Kong is an ideal test balloon for 
Beijing in the struggle for international 
discourse power over legal issues. The legal 
situation is at the very least debatable and 
Beijing has extensive expertise in this area. 
The Chinese communication strategy is 
streamlined and follows the guidelines from 
Beijing. Shortly after the announcement 
of the Security Law, numerous op-eds by 
former Hong Kong judges, current members 
of the judiciary and legal experts appeared, 
defending the law. In the West, however, 
Hong Kong is often the subject of emotional 
debate, possibly because hopes for political 
change in the PRC and a liberal future for 
Hong Kong have been dashed. 
Western states must perform a balancing 
act, to avoid being accused of violating 
international commitments to the PRC on 
the pretext of maintaining the internation-
al rules-based order. This is also because the 
1984 Sino-British Declaration has no erga 
omnes effect. Accordingly, it only entitles and 
obliges the contracting parties. 
In response to the suspension or termi-
nation of extradition agreements with Hong 
Kong, as decided by the governments of 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, the United States, Finland and Ire-
land, the PRC has been calling on these 
countries to comply with international law 
and the basic rules of international relations. 
However, many extradition agreements 
with Hong Kong provide for the possibility 
of suspension or termination at any time by 
giving notice. Contrary to Beijing’s wording, 
such an act thus does not constitute inter-
ference in China’s internal affairs. 
However, additional measures in re-
sponse to the Security Law cannot simply 
be based on Article 60 (termination or sus-
pension of the operation of a treaty as a 
consequence of its breach) or Article 62 
(fundamental change of circumstances) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties. The narrow scope of application of 
these articles requires a detailed case-by-
case examination. 
Meanwhile, China uses the well-known 
narrative that the West still has a colonial 
mind-set and applies double standards – 
apparently successfully in many countries. 
Strategic Embeddedness 
within BRI 
Legal cooperation programs under the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) accompany China’s 
efforts to gain international discourse power 
over legal issues. Beijing systematically en-
gages to convince economically dependent 
states of its legal positions. 
Since July 2018, Beijing has been pro-
moting this process under the umbrella of 
the Belt and Road Legal Cooperation Forum. 
Legal cooperation, as “soft connectivity”, is 
intended to complement the desired “hard 
connectivity” (e.g. the development of cross-
border infrastructure networks). 
With this often overlooked aspect of the 
BRI, the PRC aims for the juridification of 
the initiative in accordance with Chinese 
interests. Beijing points to different legal 
traditions and legal concepts around the 
world and promotes the BRI as a mechanism 
to give them international validity. China 
criticises a dominance of Western positions 
in the international legal discourse, and 
offers to be the architect of a “more demo-
cratic international rules-based order”. 
The Chinese leadership has been system-
atically developing legal expertise but not 
only within China itself; its ambitions also 
extend to BRI countries. 
In addition to standardisation efforts to 
promote international economic relations, 
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China intends (with moderate success so 
far) to establish an international BRI dis-
pute resolution mechanism. Also on the 
agenda is the establishment of what has 
been named a “Clean Silk Road”, an initia-
tive which calls for international coopera-
tion on anti-corruption and the fight against 
“terrorism, separatism and extremism”. 
During the Second Belt and Road Forum 
for International Cooperation in April 2019, 
the Communist Party’s Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection together with the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
China Law Society hosted a sub-forum en-
titled “Building a Clean Silk Road through 
Consultation and Cooperation for Shared 
Benefits”. This sub-forum focused on the 
international fight against corruption, the 
establishment of a network of extradition 
treaties and a training program for lawyers 
from BRI countries. 
The “Belt and Road Legal Cooperation Re-
search and Training Programme” launched 
in autumn 2019 serves to convey and dis-
seminate China’s international law prac-
tice, legal concept and the theory of “social-
ist law with Chinese characteristics”. Exist-
ing legal exchange programmes with devel-
oping countries are thus embedded in a 
strategic framework. The programme is 
aimed at members of the (international) 
legal departments of the respective foreign 
and justice ministries. Representatives of 
22 states, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Pakistan, 
Serbia and Turkey, took part in the first 
11-day seminar. 
Beijing also awards BRI scholarships 
aimed at developing a long-term under-
standing of China’s legal concepts (such 
as “human rights with Chinese character-
istics”, but also focusing on the systems 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan). The Chinese 
leadership is explicitly interested in 
communicating their legal positions and 
facilitating a greater understanding of 
them. The recently announced doctrine 
of “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law” 
(习近平法治思想), underscores Beijing’s 
ambitions to “promote the rule of law in 
China and foreign countries” and will 
further add momentum to China’s strategic 
engagement. 
Options for Action 
The developments in Hong Kong are a har-
binger of a self-confident China that projects 
its socialist-Leninist legal concepts inter-
nationally and is well prepared to defend 
them. 
China is striving to create a rules-based 
order in which it sets the guidelines and 
processes itself. That in itself is not sur-
prising. Leading powers are always striving 
for legal frameworks that support their 
political agenda. But China’s idea of a 
“socialist rule of law with Chinese charac-
teristics” is largely at odds with the Euro-
pean legal tradition. The Hong Kong issue 
underlines the conflicts between these 
different views. 
Legal certainty when dealing with China 
only seems possible if Beijing’s core inter-
ests are at stake and there are clear incentive 
structures in place. The scope for interpre-
tation should be kept as narrow as possible. 
This applies in particular to the current 
negotiations on the “EU-China Comprehen-
sive Agreement on Investment”. The WTO 
framework is a positive example of how 
China can be successfully integrated into 
the rules-based international order. 
Germany and Europe should first devel-
op the necessary awareness of the problem 
stemming from China’s strategy of export-
ing its approach to law. An important step 
in the right direction would be to take the 
extent of China’s ambitions and strategic 
embedding seriously. Hong Kong is not an 
isolated case, but a test balloon. It is con-
ceivable that, in future, Beijing may apply 
an excessive interpretation of the extraterri-
torial component of China’s National Secu-
rity Law or the Chinese Criminal Law and 
gain support for this from the ranks of a 
growing number of BRI states. Beijing 
already has an extensive and ever-growing 
network of extradition agreements (includ-
ing Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
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Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Spain and 
France). 
Offers of cooperation with third coun-
tries that increasingly share China’s posi-
tions could help to counteract the prospec-
tive marginalisation of Western legal con-
cepts. The German government’s Indo-
Pacific Guidelines could be a starting point 
for this. 
A sober approach to China is also needed. 
The European discourse on China is becom-
ing increasingly emotional, especially when 
it comes to Hong Kong. This is unhelpful 
and even counterproductive. 
The Security Law and its implications 
also make it clear that there is more rather 
than less need for dialogue with the PRC on 
international legal issues. The Chinese side 
is too strategic to ignore. It is therefore im-
portant to understand the Chinese lines of 
argument. It is doubtful that the German-
Chinese dialogue on the rule of law or the 
EU-China human rights dialogue offer the 
appropriate venue for this. New stimuli and 
formats are urgently needed. To ascertain 
whether the Chinese side is interested in an 
exchange on legal issues, it would be con-
ceivable, for example, for European states 
to confidently participate in the Belt and 
Road Legal Cooperation Forum. Another 
idea would be to establish a new dialogue 
format with China, specifically focusing 
on international law. 
China has already acquired sufficient 
expertise and an impressive understanding 
of European legal concepts. To understand 
the rationale behind China’s actions and 
to be able to discuss with the Chinese side 
on equal footing, it is now necessary for 
the German Bundestag, the relevant Federal 
Ministries and European policymakers to 
all acquire more knowledge on matters of 
China’s position on law and in particular 
on international law. 
Moritz Rudolf is Associate in the Asia Division at SWP. 
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